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Abstract 
The Internet Key Exchange (IKE) protocol is most widely used as a secure key exchange protocol to exchange key 
materials and negotiate security associations between two security gateways for any secure communications over 
Internet. However, the original IKE is too flexible, complex and weak to denial-of-service (DoS) attack; several 
enhanced IKE version have been proposed to replace the original one. In this paper, an elliptic curve cryptography 
(ECC) based and certificate less IKE protocol is proposed. It eliminates the use of certificates for authentication, 
replaces the RSA based Diffie-Hellman (DH) key exchange by Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman (ECDH) key exchange, 
and instead of cookies, hash value of initiator’s public key, identity and IP address is used to prevent DoS attack. One 
advantage of the proposed scheme is that it provides same level of security as RSA with less key size, as well as it 
generates an ECC based common secret key, used for symmetric encryption, which requires less processing time, less 
computation cost and less storage space than the time required in the public key encryption-based techniques. 
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1. Introduction 
The internet security for secure communication over the Internet becomes an essential requirement of 
the shared media environment. To support the requirement of cryptographic key management for secure 
Internet communication, the Internet Key Exchange (IKE) protocol [1-23] is designed. IKE, as specified 
by the Internet Society, references the Internet Security Association and Key Management Protocol 
(ISAKMP) [7, 18]. It is used for mutual authentication and establishing a shared secret session key to 
create an IPSec SA [7, 11, 12]. IPSec is an Internet Engineering Task force (IETF) [13] standard for real 
time communication security. IPSec provides security at network layer and requires a logical relationship 
called Security Association (SA) [2, 6, 7, 18] between two hosts. Prior to an IP packet being secured by 
IPSec, IKE creates SAs dynamically on behalf of IPSec and populates & manages the Security 
Association Database (SAD). 
IKE is a secure key exchange protocol and used for policy negotiation and establishment of 
authenticated keying material for a variety of needs like SNMPv3, OSPv2 [2, 6] etc. IKE uses Diffie-
Hellman Key Exchange method [3, 24, 25] to set up a shared session secret, from which cryptographic 
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keys are derived. It uses two chosen numbers called a nonce, and a cookie which are kept secret. 
However, there are many limitations [1, 5] with these concepts of nonce and cookies, especially when 
they are very large. To solve these problems some successors have been presented for IKE such as IKEv2 
[13, 15, 16], SIGMA (SIGn-and-MAc) [3], JFK (Just Fast Keying) [21] etc.  
IKEv2, an improvement over IKE, is based on public signature keys. It hides both identities from 
passive attacker and reduces number of messages to 4 in phase-I, and 2 in phase-II. But IkEv2 has large 
message sizes and encryption results in message expansion. JFK key exchange protocol was designed 
with 2 variants JKFi and JFKr to provide identity protection against active attackers for initiator and 
responder respectively. It is also based on Diffie-Hellman Key Exchange method. However, it refines D-
H exchange with anti-DoS authentication, shared-key encryption, identities and public-key signatures. A 
certificate-less IKE authentication scheme proposed in [22, 23] uses bilinear pairing and eliminates the 
need of Certificate Authority (CA). However, due to computationally expensive operation of bilinear 
pairing the scheme introduces extra processing overhead in verification algorithm. Recently, a new 
protocol for IKE is proposed in [1, 5] where instead of using nonce and a cookie, a hash function of 
public encryption key and signature key are used to generate the secret session key. Though it reduces 
overhead of using the nonce and cookies, it requires a number of additional calculations.  
To remove these difficulties, an IKE protocol based on Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC) [26-28] is 
proposed in this paper. It replaces the D-H Key Exchange, and instead of cookies, hash value of initiator’s 
public key, IP address and identity is used to prevent clogging attack, and also eliminates the use of 
certificates to guarantee authentication of public keys.  
The remaining parts of this paper are organized as follows: section 2 introduces the internet key 
exchange protocol and general header. In section 3, the ECC based IKE protocol is proposed. A security 
analysis regarding the fulfilment of several criteria and protection from cryptographic attacks, and 
comparison with existing schemes are given in section 4. Finally, section 5 concludes the proposed 
scheme. 
2. Preliminaries on IKE 
To facilitate understanding of our proposed protocol, the following articles are briefly introduced. 
2.1. Internet Key Exchange (IKE) 
IKE is a protocol used to establish shared security parameters and authenticated keys (i.e. SAs) 
between IPSec peers. IKE, defined by Internet Society in [10, 18], is based upon the framework defined 
by ISAKMP and implements parts of two key management protocols- Oakley & SKEME [18].  
IKE protocol is performed by each party i.e. both which are IPSec peers. The protocol is a request- 
response type with an initiator and a responder. IKE is defined in two phases:  
Phase I: It does mutual authentication and establishes session keys. It is based on identities e.g. Names, 
and secrets as public key parameter or pre-shared secrets between the two peers. It also establishes an 
IKE SA.      
Phase II: Using the IKE SA, established in phase I, multiple phase II SAs between the same peers of 
entities can be established which is called IPSec SAs. 
There are two types of phase I exchanges called modes: Aggressive mode and Main mode. Aggressive 
mode accomplishes the task in 3 messages and main mode in 6 messages. While previous mode is faster, 
the latter one is more flexible. There is a single phase II exchange called Quick mode. 
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2.2. General header (HDR) 
Message exchanges in an ISAKMP-based key management protocol are constructed by chaining 
together ISAKMP payloads to an ISAKMP header [7]. The format of the general header is shown in Fig 1 
where the first two spaces (gray colored boxes) carried Cookie-I and Cookie-R according to the IKE 
protocol as specified by Internet Society. Since in our proposed protocol the need of cookies has been 
eliminated, those two spaces should be deleted.
 
Fig. 1. General format of ISAKMP header 
3. Proposed Technique 
To overcome the limitations of previous protocols, an ECC-based IKE protocol is proposed in this 
section. 
3.1. Notations used  
We first introduce common notations used in this paper as follows: 
x p, n     : two large prime numbers; 
x Fp       : a finite field; 
x E         : an elliptic curve defined on finite   
            field Fp with prime order n; 
x G       :the group of elliptic curve points on 
E; 
x P        :a point on elliptic curve E with order 
n; 
x I           : initiator; 
x  R         : responder; 
x HDR    : ISAKMP-Header 
x SAOFFD: a list of cryptographic proposals of 
the initiator. 
x SASELEC : cryptographic protocols selected by 
the responder from the list sent by the 
initiator. 
x  IDI        : the identity of the initiator I; 
x  IDR           : the identity of the responder R; 
x NI         : nonce of initiator. 
x NR         : nonce of responder. 
x  (kI, PUI): the initiator I’s private-public key  
                 pair, where PUI = kI.P. 
x  (kR, PUR): the responder R’s private-public   
                  key pair, where PUR = kR.P. 
x XI = prf (IPI | IDI | PUI) 
x XR = prf (IPR | IDR |PUR)
Where, prf stands for pseudo- random function, is a keyed- hash function defined in negotiation phase. 
3.2. Phase-I of the proposed protocol  
In our proposed ECC-based IKE protocol, the initiator must know the identity and IP address of the 
desired responder to initiate key negotiation. The IP address of the responder is unique and his system is 
password protected. The details of phase-I of the proposed protocol as shown in Fig 3 is as follows: 
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Fig. 2. Phase-I of proposed IKE protocol 
Step 1: Initiator ĺ Responder: HDR, SAOFFD 
The initiator sends a series of cryptographic proposals for SA to the responder whose identity and 
IP address are known to initiator.  
Step 2: Responder ĺ Initiator: HDR, SASELEC, PUR, NR, XR 
The responder selects an SA from SAOFFD according to its preference, generates XR and sends 
these to initiator along with its public key PUR and a nonce NR. The nonce is generated to prevent 
from replay attack. If the responder does not agree for an SA then it can reject the entire list of SA 
and sends back an error in second message. 
Step 3: Initiator ĺ Responder: HDR, PUI, NI, XI, (IDI, IPI, HASH-I) 
The initiator calculates its own XR using known IPR, IDR and received public key of responder 
(PUR) and compares it with the received XR. If they don’t match, it implies the user B is using a 
bogus IP and hence the message exchange is terminated. If they match, then the initiator 
calculates the common secret key K= kI.PUR = kI.kR.P = (KX, KY) = (Skey_e, KY), and generates 
XI. Now the initiator calculates a hash value HASH-I= prf (SKEYID, IPI, IPR|SAOFFD|IDI) where 
SKEYID = prf (Skey_e , NI| NR ) and encrypts it along with IDI, IPI using Skey_e, and sends it 
along with its public key (PUI), XI and a nonce NI. 
Step 4: Responder ĺ Initiator: HDR, ESkey-e (HASH-R ) 
After receiving the message 3, the responder calculates the common secret key as K= kR.PUI = 
kR.kI.P = (KX, KY) = (Skey_e, KY), generates the SKEYID = prf (Skey_e , NI| NR ) and decrypts the 
received encrypted message using Skey_e. Now it calculates its own XI using received IPI, IDI and 
PUI, and compares it with received value of XI to verify that the initiator is not bogus. If it is 
verified, then it calculates its own HASH-I using SKEYID and received IPI and IDI and compares 
the same with the received value of HASH-I. If it matches then the responder calculates a hash 
value HASH-R= prf (SKEYID, IPI, IPR|SAOFFD|IDR), encrypts it using Skey_e and sends it to the 
initiator. 
Here, SAOFFD, the entire SA data sent by initiator during Step1, is used to calculate both HASH-I and 
HASH-R in steps 3 and 4 respectively to protect the proposal from an intruder to make any changes. After 
successful authentication of both peers, the initiator and the responder agree to calculate a derived key 
(SKEYID_d), an authentication key (SKEYID_a) and an encryption key (SKEYID_e) using the common 
key (SKEYID) as: SKEYID_d = prf ( SKEYID, KY |0 ), SKEYID_a = prf ( SKEYID, SKEYID_d, KY |1 ), 
SKEYID_e = prf ( SKEYID, SKEYID_a, KY |2 ) 
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3.3. Phase-II of the proposed protocol  
After the successful completion of phase I, quick mode uses the IKE SA to create IPSec SAs. The IKE 
SA protects a quick mode exchange by encrypting and authenticating the messages. Either of initiator or 
responder of phase I can initiate phase II. The generation of new public keys PI and PR of initiator and 
responder in phase-II is optional and these are exchanged only if PFS (Perfect Forward Security) is 
desired. Similarly, the identities of the two peers are also optional as they have already authenticated each 
other’s identity during phase I exchange. However they may be included to exchange as selected 
information to describe the purpose of SA payloads being established. The details of phase-II of the 
proposed ECC-based IKE protocol as shown in Fig 4 is illustrated as follows: 
Step 1: Initiator ĺ Responder: HDR, ESKEYID-e (HASH 1, SA, NI, [PI, IDI, IDR]) 
The initiator generates the hash value HASH 1 = prf (KY, MsgID| SA| NI) to authenticate the 
message where KY is generated in Phase I, SA is IKE SA of Phase I, and NI is a new nonce for 
phase-II. Now it encrypts the HASH 1, SA, NI and optional parameters if needed using the 
encryption key (SKEYID_e) of phase-I, and sends it to the responder. 
                        
Fig. 3. Phase-II of proposed IKE protocol 
Step 2: Responder ĺ Initiator: HDR, ESKEYID-e (HASH 2, SA, NR, [PI, ID, IDR]) 
The responder decrypts the received encrypted message using SKEYID_e of phase I and calculates 
its own HASH 1 using received NI and MsgID, and compares it with the received HASH 1. If they 
match, only then the responder calculates a hash value HASH 2 = prf (KY, MsgID| SA| NR) to 
authenticate the next message where NR is a new nonce of responder for phase –II; else exchange is 
terminated. Now it encrypts the HASH 2, SA, NR and optional parameters if needed using the 
encryption key (SKEYID_e) of phase-I, and sends it to the initiator. 
Step 3: Initiator ĺ Responder: HDR, ESKEYID-e (HASH 3) 
After receiving the message 2, the initiator decrypts it using SKEYID_e and verifies the 
authenticity of it by calculating its own HASH 2 using received NR and MsgID, and comparing it 
with the received value of HASH 2. If they match, only then the initiator calculates a hash value 
HASH 3 = prf (Ky, MsgID| SA| NI| NR), encrypts it using SKEYID_e and finally sends the encrypted 
hash value for final authentication; else exchange is terminated. The HASH 3 includes both NI and 
NR to prove to responder that he is a real live and active participant in the exchange; otherwise it 
may lead to DoS (Denial of Service). 
Since, multiple Quick Mode exchanges can be performed simultaneously, there must be some way to 
multiplex the IKE messages and determine which message refers to which exchange. Each Quick Mode 
exchange has a unique message ID in the ISAKMP header, and hence is used to identify the state to 
which a particular message refers. Also, since all the Quick Mode messages are protected by the same 
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IKE SA, message ID is used to coordinate the Initialization Vector (IV) for encryption and decryption to 
prevent two IKE peers from getting out of synchronization and not being able to decrypt messages that 
the other party encrypted. In addition to this, initiator needs a liveness proof that the responder is on-line 
and has actually processed his initial Quick Mode message. To do this, the responder includes the 
initiator’s nonce and the message ID of the exchanged message in the authenticating hash payload that 
not only provides message integrity and source authentication to the initiator, but also provides a liveness 
proof. After completion of the phase II, the results are two security associations (SAs): one for inbound 
traffic and other for outbound traffic, and a key material (KM) is generated as follows:   
KM = prf ( SKEYID_d, protocol | SPI| NI| NR )    ……without PFS              
KM = prf ( SKEYID_d, KX | protocol| SPI| NI| NR)   ……..using PFS 
Where, KX is the x-coordinate of the common secret key generated during phase II using Perfect Forward 
Security (PFS). The key material (KM) is unidirectional since Security Parameter Index (SPI) is different 
in each direction and there is one key for each direction to protect the IP traffic. 
4. Security analysis of the proposed scheme 
The proposed protocol holds up several levels of criteria and free from several known cryptographic 
attacks as described below: 
x Denial-of-Service (DoS) Attack: In step 2 of phase-I, the responder sends its public key PUR and a 
hash value XR; where XR = prf (IPR | IDR | PUR). Then in step 3, the initiator calculates its own XR, say 
XRƍ using the received value of PUR as XRƍ = prf (IPR | IDR | PUR) and compares it with received XR. If 
XR = XRƍ then the initiator calculates the common secret key and replies with the next message. Instead 
of responder, if an attacker responds with his IP address, then XR and XRƍ would not have been 
matched since the initiator calculates XRƍ using legal responder’s IP address. In this case, the process 
is terminated immediately and the corresponding party does not spend the time and effort to calculate 
the half- key or session key. Similarly, using the content of message in step 3 the responder can 
prevent DoS attack from his side. In Step 3 of phase-II, the initiator includes both nonces: NI and NR, 
and the responder’s identity in the authenticating hash payload to prove to the responder that it is real 
live and active member in the key exchange protocol. Thus our proposed protocol is free from Denial-
of-Service (DoS) attack. 
x Replay Attack: Replay attack means an intruder can act as a legal client by reusing the information 
obtained from previous run protocol. To prevent the information of one session to be replayed in 
future session by a malicious intruder, nonce NR and NI are added in step 2 and step 3 of phase I, and 
phase II respectively. Nonce refers to a number that is used only once. It could be a sequence number, 
or a large number or even a timestamp.  
x Man-in-Middle Attack:
                                   
Suppose a malicious intruder C comes between users A and B, and generates one session key KAC 
between A and itself and another session key KBC between B and itself without the knowledge of A or 
B. C can decrypt whatever message A is sending to B (or rather thinks he is sending it to B) because it 
is encrypted using the key KAC. C can now decrypt and modify the message, re-encrypt it-using key 
KBC, and retransmit it to B. Same things happen for the messages sent by B to A. This attack is called 
man-in-middle attack. In our protocol, the IP address comes automatically from the user’s computer 
and not given by the user, and is used to generate XR. Since IP address for each computer is unique 
and we can assume that the system is password protected, then there is no way that any intruder is able 
528   Sangram Ray et al. /  Procedia Technology  4 ( 2012 )  522 – 529 
to generate the same value of XR. As a result, in step 3 of phase I, if the values of XR and XRƍ are not 
equal then the attack is detected. Thus our proposed protocol is free from man-in-middle attack. 
x Impersonation attack: In our proposed protocol, the XI and XR are generated using IP address 
provided by the system, and since IP address of every system is unique and assuming that the system 
of peers are password protected then we can be sure that no other person can generate exact same XR 
or XI. Thus, if any other person tries to fake the initiator then it will be detected in step 4 of phase I, 
when received XI will not match the calculated XI using received IPI & IDI by the responder. Similarly, 
in case of fake responder, error will be detected in step 3 of phase I. 
x Perfect Forward Security (PFS): All IPSec keys are derived from the same source and are therefore 
all related. If an attacker is able to determine the SKEYID_d from the IKE SA, he would easily 
determine all the keys of all IPSec SAs derived (in future too) from that SKEYID_d. To generate the 
key material KM, the new shared secret key KX is used which is generated using provisional provided 
parameter during the phase II exchange. These secret keys are zeroed as soon as exchange is finished. 
Thus, our proposed protocol supports the PFS. 
x Efficiency: Since our proposed protocol uses ECC, a considerably smaller key size is used for 
achieving the same level of security compared to previously used RSA based methods. e.g. key size of 
1024 bits of RSA is equivalent to only 160 bits of ECC key to provide same level of security. Also, 
the number of message exchanges in phase I reduces to 4 from 6. This concludes that the proposed 
protocol is more efficient than existing RSA based protocols. 
x Reduced Overhead: The proposed protocol offers significant reduction in infrastructure complexity as 
it does not use the public key certificate and CA to guarantee the authentication of public keys, and 
hence reduces the cost for establishing and managing the public key infrastructure (PKI). 
x Key Control: This proposed protocol supports the key control of initiator (or responder) as public keys 
are generated themselves and no pre-shared key is used to calculate shared session key.  
 
The comparative results of the proposed ECC based scheme with other existing RSA based schemes is 
summarized in Table 1, which shows the better performance of our scheme in all respect than other ones. 
Table 1. Comparison of existing RSA based schemes [1-21] and the proposed scheme 
Parameters Existing RSA based schemes [1-21] Proposed scheme 
Cryptosystem RSA ECC 
Message encryption based on Public key Symmetric key 
Key exchange based on DH key exchange ECDH key exchange 
Avoidance of cookies No Yes 
Avoidance of public key certificate No Yes 
Less bit-size of key to provide same level of security No (1024 bits) Yes (160 bits) 
Faster and more efficient No Yes 
Key privacy to peers only No Yes 
PFS No Yes 
No. of message exchanges in phase-I 6 4 
Avoidance of: Replay, DoS, Man-in-middle attack Yes Yes 
Reduced message payloads, computation cost No Yes 
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5. Conclusion 
An ECC based and certificate less Internet Key Exchange (IKE) protocol is proposed in this paper. 
The Phase I exchanges establish IKE SA of two entities and generates the ECC based derived key, 
authentication key and encryption key for Phase II exchanges. The Phase II exchanges establish the IPSec 
SA and guarantee secure communication. Several advantages like less computation cost, faster processing 
time, small key size, less no of message exchanges etc make the proposed protocol better than others. The 
security analysis of the proposed protocol along with a comparison reflects the importance of our 
proposed protocol over some recent existing protocols. 
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